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Abstract
We present and study a model of cultural transmission of social norms
in a setting where agents are repeatedly matched to play a one-shot inter-
action prisoners’ dilemma. There are two types of agents in the society:
some that adhere to a social norm of cooperation and some that don’t.
Limited integration of these two types can bias the matching structure
in the sense that types interact with increased probability among them-
selves. In contrast to many standard evolutionary approaches, we find
that cooperation often survives in the long-run. Specifically we find that
while high degrees of separation are needed to protect strict norms for
cooperation, norms of intermediate strength can survive in a variety of
settings. Endogenizing norm strength, we find two scenarios in which
pro-social norms survive. One is a rigid society in which separation leads
to equilibria with strict norms for cooperation, and one is an integrated
society where equilibria display heterogeneity of types and norms of inter-
mediate strength. Furthermore integration and cooperation are not linked
in a monotone way. JEL-Classification: C70, C73, Z13.
∗I thank Fernando Vega Redondo, Christian Traxler as well as two anonymous referees for
very valuable suggestions. I also wish to thank participants at seminars and conferences in
A Corunˇa, Amsterdam, Bayreuth (VFS 2006), Istanbul (SCW 2006), Jena, Karlsruhe, Ko¨ln,
Valencia and Vienna (ESEM 2006) for their comments. Part of this research was conducted
while I was staying at the Max-Planck Institute of Economics in Jena. I thank the Institute
for its hospitality. An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the name ”A Model
of Immigration, Integration and Cultural Transmission of Social Norms”.
†Departamento de Fundamentos del Ana´lisis Economico, Universidad de Alicante, 03080
Alacant, Spain. E-mail : friederike@merlin.fae.ua.es
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1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the question of whether pro-social norms can persist
in a society if some agents have not internalized these norms.1 Such agents
can appear in a society for example through immigration or through a failure of
society to transmit its social norms to part of the population. More precisely we
consider a setting where agents are matched to play a one-shot interaction pris-
oners’ dilemma in a society where there is a social norm for cooperation. There
are two types of agents. Some have internalized a social norm for cooperation
but some have not. We address the following questions.
• Can a social norm for cooperation persist in a society where some agents
have not internalized the norm ?
• How does the answer to the previous question depend on the institutions
of society and in particular on the degree of integration of the two types ?
From the standard perspective of a direct evolutionary approach the first
question has a clear-cut answer: If evolutionary selective forces apply directly to
strategies, if the population dynamics is payoff monotonic, and if matching takes
places randomly within the whole population, cooperation is never evolutionary
stable.2
In this paper we deviate from the assumptions of the standard approach
in three ways. First the cultural transmission mechanism for social norms we
model applies to preferences instead of strategies. Holding their preferences
fixed, agents are assumed to act rationally.
Secondly we vary the matching technology assuming that different degrees of
integration are reflected in the probability that agents of the same type interact
with each other. The degree of integration in our approach has two kinds of
effects: short-run effects by changing the incentives of rational players and long-
run effects by affecting norm strength and the evolution of preferences.
Thirdly we analyze two cases for norm strength. The strength of some norms
can be exogenous (independent of the degree of norm-internalization), but for
some it will increas with the level of norm-internalization in the society.
We start by analyzing the case of exogenous norm strength and find that
for strict norms, a high level of separation or other form of institutional pres-
sure are needed to have cooperation survive. Norms of intermediate strength
on the contrary can survive under a variety of settings. Under some parameter
constellations they survive even in fully integrated societies. Endogenous norms
persist in two polar scenarios. One of a rigid society in which separation leads
to monomorphic equilibria with strict norms for cooperation. Cooperation in
this scenario is achieved through rigid population structures that in turn lead
to strict norms. In this sense rigidity is self-reinforcing. The second scenario is
one of an integrated society with intermediate norms that displays heterogeneity
1Pro-social norms are norms that induce agents to act in a way conferring benefits to others
at a cost to themselves.
2Weibull (1995), Vega-Redondo (1996).
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of types in equilibrium. Integration stabilizes a polymorphic equilibrium with
norms that are less strict. Thus in contrast to standard direct and indirect evo-
lutionary approaches, the mechanism based on endogenous social norms always
produces polymorphic equilibria in fully integrated societies (where matching is
random). Furthermore we show that integration and cooperation are not linked
in a monotone way.
Our approach is very closely related to the indirect evolutionary approach
in that, while putting selection pressures on preferences it does not deny that
holding their preferences fixed, agents act rationally. Bester and Gu¨th (1998)
or Guttman (2003) have studied such mechanisms.
The evolution of pro-social preference traits has also been studied in cul-
tural evolutionary models that try to go beyond the pure fitness implications
of preferences and (induced) strategies and consider explicitly the process of
transmission of traits through the family (vertical transmission), peer-groups
(horizontal transmission), or socializing institutions of society (oblique trans-
mission).3 Gintis (2003) presents a model with exogenous vertical and oblique
transmission and an (also exogenous) fitness-disadvantage for agents who have a
preference for altruism. His main finding is that in order for the altruistic pref-
erence to survive the level of oblique transmission has to be sufficiently high.
Henrich and Boyd (2001) consider a model in which norms are transmitted
through social learning. In their model pro-social norms are stable because the
horizontal transmission process stabilizes punishment of non-adherers.
The rational socialization approach to preference formation assumes that
altruistic and forward-looking parents deliberately pass preferences on to their
children, trying to maximize what they, as parents, see to be the children’s fu-
ture well-being. Bisin et al (2004) present a model of endogenous vertical trans-
mission in which altruistic preferences survive, because minorities have higher
incentives to socialize their offspring to their own preferences than majorities
do.4
Whereas all the previous studies consider only the case of random matching,
we parametrize several matching scenarios ranging from full separation (where
interact only with their type) to the standard case of random matching. These
kind of matching structures have been considered mostly in the biological liter-
ature.5 The case typically studied in this literature corresponds to our case of
strict norms.
Our study also differs from the above approaches in focusing explicitly on
the role of society and social norms. In this sense it relates to studies of norm-
guided behavior in other fields of economics. Lindbeck et al (1999) use a model
with endogenous social norms to examine the interaction of monetary incentives
and social norms in the welfare state. In Benabou and Tirole (2006), norms
with endogenous strength are part of a theory of pro-social behavior. To our
3See Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Henrich and Boyd (2001), Henrich and Gil-White
(2000), Boyd and Richerson (2005) or Henrich (2004).
4See also Guttman (2001a, 2001b).
5See Hamilton (1964), Price (1970), Myerson et al (1991), Henrich (2004), Boyd and Rich-
erson (1990), Mitteldorf and Wilson (2000) or Bowles and Gintis (1997).
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knowledge our study is unique in examining the consequence of endogenous
social norms for the evolutionary selection of preference traits.6
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is described. In
section 3 we study the equilibria of the model with exogenous norm strength,
and in section 4 norm strength is endogenized. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a society consisting of a (unit-mass) continuum of individuals I. In-
dividuals are probabilistically and repeatedly matched in pairs to interact in
prisoners’ dilemma type of situations for an infinite number of periods.
In the bilateral game each player has two actions available: C and D. The
action set Z = {C,D} is the same for all players i ∈ I. Payoffs from the
prisoners’ dilemma interaction are given by
C D
C a, a 0, 1
D 1, 0 d, d
(1)
where 1 > a > d > 0. It is well known that in this game D is a dominant
strategy for both players and consequently the unique equilibrium prediction
leads to a payoff of d for both players.
2.1 The Social Norm
Definition 1 (Social Norm) An (internalized) social norm is a code of con-
duct shared by a society and enforced through internal sanctions, including
shame, guilt, embarrassment anxiety and loss of self-esteem. As such, an
internalized social norm directly affects the utility function.
It is important to distinguish internalized social norms (which we deal with
here) from external norms that are sustained through external punishment or
social (dis-) approval.7 Also note that social norms differ from conventions in
that the latter are purely descriptive while the first have normative character. A
convention can be seen as a behavioral regularity that helps to solve coordination
problems in so iety.8
Definition 2 (Norm-internalization) We say that a person ”has internal-
ized a social norm” whenever he or she suffers internal sanctions upon
deviating from the norm.
6Obviously our study also ties in with other studies of norm-guided behaviour such as Azar
(2001), Elster (1989), Nyborg and Rege (2003), Traxler (2005), Young (1998), Cialdini et al
(1990), Grasmick and Green (1980), Liu (2003) or Reno et al. (1993) among many others.
7This would be an alternative modeling approach. In this case the analysis becomes slightly
more complicated but the results do not change qualitatively.
8To distinguish these terms is important as they have been used in the literature in different
ways. Our definition follows Cialdini et al (1990), Grasmick and Green (1980), Elster (1989),
Gintis (2003), Lindbeck et al (1999) or Traxler (2005) among others. Young (1998) for example
uses a different terminology.
3
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Note that this implies that a person who has internalized the norm need not
necessarily behave in the way the norm prescribes whenever the (material) costs
of doing so are too high. For agents who have internalized the social norm the
psychological cost w associated with deviating from it is reflected in the payoffs
as follows:
C D
C a, a 0, 1− w
D 1− w, 0 d− w, d − w
(2)
We will distinguish between three different strengths of the norm. In par-
ticular we will call the social norm weak if w < min{1− a, d}, i.e. if violation of
the norm causes feelings of guilt so weak that they are always outweighed by the
material payoff-advantage of defecting (playing D). In this case the two game
forms (1) and (2) represent the same strategic context, namely that of a pris-
oners’ dilemma. We will call the norm intermediate in the following two cases:
if w ∈ [1 − a, d] (2) represents a stag-hunt game, having two symmetric Nash-
equilibria in pure strategies where both agents play the same strategy (either C
or D) and if w ∈ [d, 1− a] then (2) represents a chicken game, with two asym-
metric Nash-equilibria in pure strategies where one plays C and the other plays
D. The unique symmetric Nash-equilibrium in this case is in mixed strategies
where each player plays w−d1−a−dC⊕
1−a−w
1−a−dD. Finally we will call a norm strict if
w > max{1− a, d} (if the internal punishment caused by a norm-violation is so
strong that cooperation is a dominant strategy for an agent having internalized
this norm).
2.2 The Population Game
Types
Let the type space be T = {0, w} with typical element τ , where a w- type’s
payoffs are defined in (2) and a 0- type‘s payoffs in (1). w- types have internalized
the norm and 0- types have not. Agents have incomplete information about each
other’s type. When choosing an action z ∈ Z in the bilateral game they estimate
the type of their match from the distribution of types in the economy and from
their knowledge about the matching technology described below. Let p denote
the share of w- types in the population. Obviously then the share of 0- types is
1−p. A complete description of the population is given by the population profile
(σ0, σw, p) where στ = (στC , σ
τ
D) denotes the distribution of actions among τ -
types. στC is the share of τ - types that use action C.
9 The population profile is
known to all agents at all times.
Matching
Matching takes place in a not - fully - integrated population, where indi-
viduals interact with increased probability with individuals of their type. We
measure the degree of integration of a society with the parameter x ∈ [0, 1],
9Note that σ = (σ0, σw) can be seen as formally equivalent to a pure strategy in the
(bilateral) Bayesian game where σ0 denotes the (mixed) action a player chooses conditional
on being a 0- type and σw the action a player chooses conditional on being a w- type.
4
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where x = 1 means that the society is fully integrated. In this case matching
is random. x = 0 means that there is full separation, implying that types in-
teract with probability 1 among themselves and never with agents of another
type. More precisely a w- type is matched with probability (1 − p)x with a 0-
type and with probability 1− (1− p)x with another w- type, while a 0- type is
matched with probability px with a w- type and with probability (1− px) with
another 0- type.
Material Payoffs and Utility
For any fixed distribution of types p and degree of separation x denote
Πτ (z, σ) the expected material payoffs of a type τ agent when choosing action
z in a population that plays σ = (σ0, σw). Analogously denote piτ (z, σ) the
expected utility of a type τ agent when choosing action z in a population that
plays σ. For a 0−type material payoffs coincide with utility whereas for a w−type
utility is in general distinct from material payoffs because of the psychological
payoff loss. More precisely Πτ (z, σ) and piτ (z, σ) are given by the following
expressions.
pi0(C, σ) = Π0(C, σ) = a[(1− px)σ0C + pxσ
w
C ]
pi0(D,σ) = Π0(D,σ) = (1 − px)(σ0C + σ
0
Dd) + px(σ
w
C + σ
w
Dd)
piw(C, σ) = Πw(C, σ) = a[(1 − p)xσ0C + (1− (1− p)x) σ
w
C ]
piw(D,σ) = (1− p)x(σ0C(1− w) + σ
0
D(d− w))
+ (1− (1− p)x) (σwC(1 − w) + σ
w
D(d− w))
Πw(D,σ) = (1− p)x(σ0C + σ
0
Dd) + (1− (1− p)x) (σ
w
C + σ
w
Dd)
Nash Equilibrium
Having specified payoffs we have a complete description of the population
game Γ = (I, T, Z, p, pi(·)). To describe optimal behavior we rely on the concept
of Nash-equilibrium.10
Definition 3 (Nash equilibrium) A Nash equilibrium of Γ is any population
profile (σ0, σw, p) such that στz > 0⇒ z ∈ argmaxZ pi
τ (z, σ), ∀τ ∈ T.
We are now interested in how rational behavior in the population game
affects the cultural transmission of social norms.
2.3 The cultural transmission process
Social norms are internalized via three mechanisms described below: vertical
transmission (socialization through parents), horizontal transmission (peer in-
teraction) and institutional transmission.11
10Again there is a formal equivalence between the Nash-equilibria of Γ and the symmetric
Bayes-Nash equilibria of the bilateral game with incomplete information.
11The term oblique transmission is typically used instead of institutional transmission. We
chose the latter because our focus is on intra-generational transmission. See Gintis (2003),
Bisin et al (2004), Cavalli-Sforza and Feldmann (1981) or Cialdini and Trost (1998) among
others.
5
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Horizontal Transmission
Agents internalize social norms partly through social learning from peers.
We assume that this process is payoff-biased (agents are more likely to adapt
norms from materially successful agents).12 As in indirect evolutionary models
there is thus a distinction in our model between the payoffs that drive behavior
and those that are relevant for selection.13
Definition 4 (Cultural Model) A cultural model of type m for agent i is
another agent who reveals her preferences and material payoffs to i.
A cultural model can, for example, be a friend, a colleague or a partner.
At any point in time t an individual of type τ meets a cultural model of type
mt ∈ {0, w} according to the matching probabilities and observes the model’s
type and material payoff Πmt in that period.
14 Note that the cultural model is
not the person one interacts with in the stage game. If an agent’s cultural model
is of his type he will stick to his norm with probability 1. If the cultural model
is of another type he might adopt her norm with a probability that depends
linearly on (positive) payoff-differences. The probability that an individual of
type τ adapts the m- norm at time t is given by
Pr(mt|τ )t =
{
(1− α) + α(Πmt −Π
τ
t )1+ if m
t 6= τ
1 if mt = τ
. (3)
α ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that measures the importance of the payoff-bias in
horizontal transmission. 1+ is the indicator function taking the value 1 if the
preceding term is positive and 0 otherwise.15 The total share of w- types in the
population after horizontal transmission is then given by
Pr(w)t = pt(1− Pr(0|w)t) + (1− pt) Pr(w|0)t (4)
= pt + (1− pt)ptxα(Π
w
t −Π
0
t ).
Accordingly
Pr(0)t = 1− Pr(w)t (5)
denotes the total share of 0- types after horizontal transmission.16
12There is evidence suggesting that agents are more likely to adopt norms from agents who
are materially rich. See Henrich and Gil-White (2000) or Boyd and Richerson (2005).
13See Bester and Gu¨th (1998) or Huck (1998) among others. Having selection work on
utility (instead of material preferences) would make the modeling exercise meaningless, as the
survival of a trait in this case depends on how strong it is assumed to be.
14We will omit the argument of the payoff function when it can be done without ambiguity.
15Such linear rules are standard in the literature on social learning. Properties of such rules
are derived in Schlag (1998) or Manski (2004) among others.
16Some norms can be transmitted simply by observing other’s behavior (see e.g. Cialdini et
al (1990)). Note though that agents with different norms can display the same behavior in this
model. That is why preferences have to be observed here for norm transmission. See Cialdini
and Trost for a discussion. Many studies also show that transmission mainly operates between
people who feel ”close” to each other. Latane´ (1996) for example emphasizes the importance
of communication for norm-transmission.
6
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Institutional Transmission
The adoption of pro-social norms can be enhanced through the institutions of
a society.17 By structuring interactions institutions lead to framing and other
situation construal effects that favor the spread of some social norms. Legal
norms or government policies can stigmatize some behaviors while promoting
others. The pro-social norm can also be transmitted through socialization insti-
tutions such as schools, universities or churches. Finally communication media
can shift reference points and affect norm-transmission. Under the influence of
institutional pressures some 0- types will switch to the w- norm. Institutional
transmission is proportional to the ”effective” number of w- types in the society
(the number of w- types a 0- type perceives in his environment ptx). The under-
lying idea is that institutional transmission is more effective if there are more
w- types. Legal norms turn more easily into social norms, public policies are
better implemented and norms more efficiently transmitted in schools if there
are more w- types.18 Having the parameter ψ ∈ [0, 1] measure the strength of
institutional pressures the share of 0- types that adapt the w- norm because of
institutional transmission is given by ptxψ.
Vertical Transmission
As the focus of the paper is on intra-generational, we assume that vertical
transmission is unbiased in the sense that each τ−type at his/her death leaves
exactly one offspring of type τ .
Population Dynamics
Adding up we get the following population dynamics:
pt+1 = Pr(w)t + ptxψ(1− Pr(w)t)
= pt + pt(1− pt)x[α(Π
w
t −Π
0
t )(1 − ptxψ) + ψ],
or in the continuous time approximation,
·
p = p(1− p)x[α(Πw − Π0)(1 − pxψ) + ψ] =: f(p). (6)
Note that if ψ = 0 this equals the familiar replicator dynamics (up to a
change of time scale). The cultural transmission process is illustrated in Figure
1.
Figure 1 about here
3 Cultural Equilibrium
We call a cultural equilibrium in this model a situation where - given equilibrium
play in the population game - the share of w− types in the population remains
constant.
17Many studies show that ideals and norms are not absolute but influenced by the in-
stitutional structure in which an agent is placed. See Schotter et al (1996), Alesina and
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2005), Bowles (1998), Huck (1998) or Gintis (2003) among others.
18While it is clear that institutional transmission cannot be independent of the effective
number of w- types, the assumption of exact proportionality is maybe the most conservative
in an attempt to keep the number of parameters in the model limited.
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Definition 5 (Cultural Equilibrium) A cultural equilibrium is a population
state p that satisfies
·
p = 0 in equation (6).
Typically we will be interested in cultural equilibria that are locally asymp-
totically stable in the sense that the state trajectory always returns to the equi-
librium state given that it is ”close enough”. The set of locally stable cultural
equilibria obviously depends on the strength of the norm. We will describe the
different cases in turn.
3.1 Weak Norm
If the norm is weak, defection is a dominant strategy in the bilateral game
for both the w- and the 0- types. In this case the population dynamics is
trivial; since payoffs for both types are the same, horizontal transmission is
neutral and the dynamics is governed by institutional transmission only. Full
internalization of the w- norm (p = 1) is globally stable whenever (ψ, x) >> 0.
Note though that with weak norms norm - internalization leads to behavior
that is ”phenotypically” indistinguishable from behavior without the norm. Any
cultural equilibrium will be characterized by full defection. As an illustration
consider the example of charities in the US that make commercials using the
slogan ”almost giving is not enough”. This could suggest that many people have
internalized a weak norm for giving, believing that giving (C) is good (or not
giving (D) bad), but not acting upon this belief.
3.2 Strict Norm
If the norm is strict, cooperation is a dominant strategy for the w- type. Conse-
quently all the Nash-equilibria of the population game are of the form (D,C, p)
i.e. population profiles where all 0- types play D and all w- types play C. The
cultural equilibria in this case are both monomorphic states as well as the poly-
morphic states p1 and p2.
19 Which of these will be locally stable depends on the
vector of institutional characteristics (ψ, x). It is clear that very high institu-
tional pressures ψ always lead to the spread of the w- norm. Let us then focus
first on the more interesting case where ψ is arbitrarily small.
If the degree of integration is very small (if 0 < x < min{a−d1−d , 1 −
d
a}) the
monomorphic equilibrium p = 1 is globally stable, because for low x both types
mainly interact among each other. As a consequence w- types will get the high
payoff for joint cooperation relatively often while 0- types will often get the
lower payoff associated with mutual defection. This leads to global convergence
to p = 1.
If integration takes on intermediate values two mutually exclusive cases arise
depending on the payoff parameters. Cooperation survives in both. If x ∈
(a−d1−d , 1−
d
a ), the globally stable equilibrium is the polymorphic state p1, since for
low levels of norm - internalization, 0- types will obtain lower material payoffs
19The expressions for p1 and p2 are rather complicated and stated in Appendix A.
8
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in expectation, which biases social learning in favor of the w- norm and has
p rise. As p rises this payoff bias shrinks and reverts at p1. If on the other
hand x ∈ (1− da ,
a−d
1−d ) this process goes the other way round. The polymorphic
equilibrium will be unstable, and both monomorphic states will be locally stable
with their basins of attraction separated by p2.
Finally if the degree of integration is very high ( x > max{1 − da ,
a−d
1−d})
0-types will be able to benefit from the cooperative behavior of the w- types
and thus obtain a higher material payoff.
Proposition 1 If w > max{1− a, d}, ψ > 0 arbitrarily small and
(i) if 0 < x < min{a−d1−d , 1−
d
a} the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = 1.
(ii) if x ∈ (a−d1−d , 1−
d
a ) the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = p1.
(iii)if x ∈ (1− da ,
a−d
1−d ) the locally stable equilibria are p
∗ = {0, 1}.
(iv) if x > max{1− da ,
a−d
1−d} the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is clear. If the social norm is strict w - types
cooperate unconditionally in the prisoners’ dilemma. The norm (and thus co-
operative behavior) survives if and only if the benefits of this altruistic behavior
fall disproportionately onto other w−types. This is the case whenever the two
types are sufficiently separated.
The more integrated societies are, the more institutional pressures are needed
to sustain strict norms. In fact there are two critical levels of institutional
pressures that can ensure the persistence of the pro-social norm. These threshold
levels are given by ψ1 =:
[x(1−d)−(a−d)]α
1−x[(a−d)−x(1−d)]α and ψ2 := α[xa−(a−d)] for the two
mutually exclusive parameter constellations where a + d ≶ 1. Note that both
thresholds are strictly increasing with α and vanish if α = 0. The reason is that
for α = 0 social learning displays no payoff-bias, but then any arbitrarily small
level of institutional transmission will induce global convergence to p = 1. Note
also that both thresholds rise with x. The intuition is that for strict norms more
integration biases social learning against the norm. Consequently institutional
pressures need to be higher to sustain it. Consider first the case where a+d < 1.
This is the case where material gains of unilateral defection are higher than the
opportunity costs of unilateral cooperation.
Corollary 1a If a+d < 1 the monomorphic equilibrium state p∗ = 1 is globally
stable iff ψ > ψ1.If ψ ∈ [ψ2, ψ1] cooperation survives in the polymorphic
equilibrium p = p1.
Proof. Appendix A
In the second case where a+ d > 1 we have:
Corollary 1b If a+d > 1 the monomorphic equilibrium state p∗ = 1 is globally
stable iff ψ > ψ2. If ψ ∈ [ψ1, ψ2] the monomorphism p = 1 is still locally
stable.
9
Page 17 of 32
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Proof. Appendix A
Figure 2 displays the state equation as a function of p and x for varying
strengths of institutional pressures.20 If ψ is small, as in Figure 2a, it is mainly
the degree of integration of the society that acts as a selecting force to determine
the set of locally stable equilibria of the system. It can be seen that for small x
only p∗ = 1 is locally stable, for intermediate x the globally stable equilibrium
is polymorphic, and for high integration p∗ = 0 is globally stable. In Figure 2b
the forces of institutional pressures outweigh the forces of integration, so p∗ = 1
is globally stable, but the speed of convergence is maximal for interior x. In
Figure 2c institutional pressures dominate all other forces. Consequently p∗ = 1
is selected, convergence being faster for higher levels of integration.
Summary With strict norms cooperation either needs high separation or suf-
ficiently strong institutional pressures to persist in a cultural population
equilibrium.
Figure 2a - 2c about here
As it should be clear by now that higher institutional pressures always en-
hance the evolutionary selection of the w- norm, we will focus in the following
sections on the case where ψ is strictly positive but arbitrarily small.
3.3 Intermediate Norm
If the norm is intermediate in strength, two mutually exclusive cases can arise
depending on the payoff-parameters.
3.3.1 a+ d > 1 : Prisoners and Stag-Hunters
In this case the norm is intermediate whenever w ∈ [1 − a, d]. The payoff table
(2) then describes a stag-hunt game. Remember that this (bilateral) game has
two Nash-equilibria in pure strategies in which players either both cooperate or
both free-ride. To see what are the Nash equilibria of the population game first
note that D is still a dominant strategy for a 0-type. Clearly then the profiles
where both types d fect ((D,D, p)) are Nash-equilibria ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. The profiles
(D,C, p) where w- types play C (and 0-types D) will be equilibria if and only if
piw(C, z∗) ≥ piw(D, z∗) (7)
where z∗ = (z0, zw)∗ = (D,C). This is equivalent to
p ≥
(1− w − a)− x(1 − d− a)
x(a+ d− 1)
=: p˜. (8)
We can state the following result.
Proposition 2 If w ∈ [1 − a, d] the Nash-equilibria of the population game Γ
are given by (D,D, p), ∀p ∈ [0, 1] and (D,C, p), ∀p ∈ [p˜, 1].
20The parameters used for the graphs are: a = 1/2, d = 1/4, and α = 1/2.
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Obviously for p ≥ p˜ an issue of equilibrium selection arises. Two cases are
possible.
Case 1a: If p ≥ p˜ the equilibrium selected is (D,D, p).
Case 1b: If p ≥ p˜ the equilibrium selected is (D,C, p).
In case 1a the parameter region here is indistinguishable from that of the
weak norm and the analysis from sub-section 3.1 applies. Let us thus focus on
case 1b.
If x < a+w−1a+d−1 , p˜ is negative implying that a w- type will cooperate uncon-
ditionally for all population shares p. The analysis for this range of x thus
corresponds to the case of the strict norm discussed above.
Focus on the case where x ≥ a+w−1a+d−1 . Then there exists a non-empty range of
population shares [0, p˜) in which w- types will find it optimal to free-ride, in this
way depriving the 0- types of their payoff advantage from unilateral defection.
Consequently if p < p˜ both types will earn the same material payoff in expecta-
tion and the dynamics of norm - internalization will be governed exclusively by
institutional transmission. This leads to a steady growth in norm - internaliza-
tion until the share of w- types reaches p˜. Two cases arise: if x ∈ (a+w−1a+d−1 ,
a−d
1−d ]
the globally stable equilibrium is p = 1, whereas if x > max{a+w−1a+d−1 ,
a−d
1−d} the
payoff-bias works against the w- norm destabilizing p = 1 and stabilizing p = p˜.
Long-run cooperation is enhanced compared to the case of strict norms.
Proposition 3 If w ∈ [1− a, d] , ψ > 0 arbitrarily small and
(i) if 0 < x < min{a+w−1a+d−1 ,
a−d
1−d} the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = 1.
(ii) if x ∈ (a−d1−d ,
a+w−1
a+d−1 ) the locally stable equilibria are p
∗ = {0, 1}.
(iii) if x ∈ [a+w−1a+d−1 ,
a−d
1−d ] the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = 1.
(ii) if x > max{a+w−1a+d−1 ,
a−d
1−d} the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = p˜.
Proof. Appendix A
Under the conditions of this proposition and if the degree of integration is
sufficiently high (x > a+w−1a+d−1 ), every stable equilibrium involves cooperation
(even if (ψ, x)→ (0, 1)). This is in stark contrast to the case of the strict norm.
With strict norms as (ψ, x) → (0, 1) the set of locally stable equilibria reduces
to p∗ = 0 . Norms of intermediate strength though will always survive in fully
integrated societies, because now w- types are conditional cooperators, cooper-
ating only if the share of w- types p is high enough. Consequently they cannot
be as easily exploited by non-cooperators. Note also that p˜ rises with the de-
gree of integration x. There will be more cooperation in any stable polymorphic
cultural equilibrium for higher degrees of integration.
3.3.2 a+ d < 1 : Prisoners and Chickens
The intermediate norm corresponding to this case is w ∈ [d, 1 − a]. The game
form (2) then represents a chicken game. This (bilateral) game has two asym-
metric Nash-equilibria in pure strategies in which one player plays C and one
player D. This has as a consequence that in a population with ”many” w-
types, there is no Nash-equilibrium where all w- types choose the same action
11
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z. In any cultural equilibrium in this region a w- type will randomize. If on the
other hand the share of 0-types is sufficiently high, a w- type will find it optimal
to play C. (As in this case he is matched with high probability with a 0- type
who has as a dominant strategy to play D.) This case occurs whenever
piw(C, z∗) ≥ piw(D, z∗) (9)
where z∗ = (D,C) or equivalently iff
p ≤
(1− w − a)− x(1− d− a)
x(a+ d− 1)
= p˜.
We can state the following result.
Proposition 4 If w ∈ [d, 1 − a] the Nash-equilibria of the population game Γ
are given by: (D,C, p), ∀p ∈ [0, p˜] and (D, (σw∗C , (1 − σ
w∗
C ), p)∀p ∈ (p˜, 1], where
σw∗C =
w−d
(1−(1−p)x)[1−a−d] .
Proof. Appendix A
Now w- types cooperate (play C) if there is a low level of norm - internal-
ization and randomize if p is high. Again for high degrees of separation full
internalization of the w- norm (p = 1) is globally stable since in this case w-
types will be mainly matched with other w- types. For intermediate degrees of
integration, a + d < 1 (meaning that the gain of unilateral defection is higher
than the (opportunity) cost of unilateral cooperation) implies that if w- types
are matched mainly with each other and if p ≥ p˜ such that they use the mixed
action σw∗ = (σw∗C , (1− σ
w∗
C )), they will obtain a higher payoff on average than
0- types mainly matched with each other. As the degree of integration rises
this material payoff advantage will diminish and finally reverse in favor of the
0- types. For p < p˜ w- types will cooperate and obtain lower material payoffs
than 0- types whenever integration is high. Consequently for very high degrees
of integration p = 0 is globally stable.
Proposition 5 If w ∈ [d, 1 − a] ,ψ > 0 arbitrarily small and
(i) if 0 < x < min{1− da ,
1−d−w
1−d } the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = 1.
(ii) if x ∈ [1− da ,
1−d−w
1−d ) the locally stable equilibria are p
∗ = {0, 1}.
(iii) if x ∈ [1−d−w1−d , 1−
d
a ] the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = p1.
(iv) if x > max{ 1−d−w1−d , 1−
d
a} the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = 0.
Proof. Appendix A
Now the pro-social norm does not survive as a preference trait in fully in-
tegrated societies (as (ψ, x) → (0, 1)), even though w- types are conditional
cooperators. The reason lies in the fact that now w- types find it optimal to
cooperate whenever they are few. This perhaps somewhat paradoxical result
comes from the incentives the payoffs in the chicken game provide. Let us com-
pare these incentives to those in the stag-hunt game: In the stag-hunt game
establishing joint cooperation is difficult because of ”fear”. A w- type fears that
12
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whenever he plays C he could be matched with someone playing D and in this
way be exploited. On the contrary in the chicken game the problem is ”greed”
rather than ”fear”; a w- type matched with someone who cooperates wants to
play D because unilateral defection is still profitable in spite of the existence of
the pro-social norm. In the stag hunt game higher shares of norm - internal-
ization enhance cooperation by w- types, because a high share of w- types can
reduce the fear of being exploited (making this more unlikely). In the chicken
game context it is a high population share of 0- types that enhances cooperation
by w- types because the probability of the match defecting is high. This renders
p = 1 unstable in integrated societies while making p = 0 a global attractor.
Note also that in the case of the chicken game full norm internalization (p = 1)
does not mean that everyone will cooperate in equilibrium. If p = 1 the level of
cooperation in the population will be σ∗ = w−d1−a−d .
21
Summary If norms are of intermediate strength cooperation can survive in both
scenarios: high separation and high integration. High institutional pres-
sures are necessary for the survival of cooperation in integrated societies
under some parameter constellations but not under others.
4 Endogenous Norm-strength
The baseline case of exogenous norms illustrates that norm strength matters
when it comes to determining the equilibrium share of w- types. For some
norms though, norm strength will not be exogenous. Rather it will depend
on the informational environment, such as, for example, the distribution of
preferences in an agent’s sample. In this section we endogenize norm strength
by linking it to the share of w- types in society.22
In particular we will assume that the strength of internal punishment rises
with the number of w- types in the sample of a particular w- type. ”It’s not
right what I’m doing, but as nobody else cares, it’s ok” is a revealing phrase
that often accompanies norm-guided behavior. Well-known examples where the
fact that norm-internalization is low reduces the strength of internal sanctions
include not going to vote, minor tax evasion, welfare dependency, not going to
church, divorce or free-riding on public transport. Consider the example of a
w- type thinking that tax evasion is ”bad”. If he is surrounded by 0- types who
argue that tax evasion is a rational reaction to a badly designed system and
thus ”not bad”, his norm will be weakened and the psychological payoff loss
upon evading taxes smaller. If on the other hand he is surrounded by w- types
who argue (like him) that tax evasion is stealing and thus ”bad”, his norm will
be strengthened and the psychological payoff loss higher.23
21The level of cooperation as a function of p is given in Proposition 4.
22Of course one could also want to endogenize x instead of or in addition to w. This would
lead to a non-trivial optimal control problem for a social planner. In addition it is not clear
what the objective function of such a planner should be, as there are several problems with
welfare measurement in this context (see an earlier version of this paper (Mengel (2006))).
23Note that in our society all w- types face the same distribution of types allowing us to
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To formalize this idea denote the proportion of w- types in a w- type’s sample
by s := [1−(1−p)x] and let the strength of the norm be given by some function
w(s) : [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
such that w(1) = 1, w(0) = 0, w(s) ∈ C2 and ∂w(s)∂s > 0. The sign of the
derivative expresses the fact that more norm - internalization tends to make a
norm stronger. The cultural equilibrium determines the strength of the norm.
On the other hand the strength of a social norm affects peoples’ preferences,
actions and the likelihood that the norm is internalized. In this way the strength
of the social norm determines the cultural equilibrium. This sort of feedback-
effects between equilibrium and social norm are in many cases characteristic for
norm-guided behavior. By focusing on only one of the two aspects, equilibrium
or norm, one can miss an important part of the picture.
The change in norm strength is linked to the evolution of norm - internal-
ization as follows:
·
w =
∂w(s)
∂s
x
·
p (10)
It can be seen that separation increases norm strength( ∂s∂x < 0). Higher
separation implies that w- types mainly interact among each other, so in each
w− type’s sample the share of w- types will be very high and consequently the
norm very strict. This fact will strongly impact our previous results.
Consider first the case where the payoff matrix (1) is such that a + d > 1.
If the degree of integration is low, w- types almost exclusively interact with
other w- types. This implies that the share of w- types in any w- type’s sample
is high, the social norm strict and thus (as we know from Section 3.2) only
sustainable through very high degrees of separation. In this sense rigidity is
self-reinforcing. Rigidity (separation) leads to strict norms, which in turn need
even more rigidity to persist.
Whenever 0 < x < min{1− da ,
a+w(s˜)−1
a+d−1 } the society is sufficiently separated
to sustain strict norms, as the benefits of pro-social behavior fall disproportion-
ately on w- types.24 In this parameter range the globally stable equilibrium is
p∗ = 1.
Slightly higher degrees of integration will still lead to strict norms, but not
anymore to a material payoff-advantage for w- types. Consequently the norm
will not be selected by the evolutionary dynamics. As the degree of integration
further rises, norm strength will fall. Finally high degrees of integration will
lead to intermediate norms sustained in polymorphic equilibria.
Note that if x is very high both monomorphic equilibria are unstable. The
reason is that if p → 1 the norm will be strict and thus not sustainable with
high integration. On the other hand if p → 0 the norm becomes weak, driving
the dynamics away from p = 0. Fully integrated societies thus sustain a globally
stable polymorphic equilibrium with intermediate norm strength.
continue to treat the norm as a unique variable.
24s˜ denotes the solution to the following fixed point equation:
(1−w(s)−a)−x(1−d−a)
x(a+d−1)
= p.
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Proposition 6 If a+ d > 1, ψ → 0 and
(i) 0 < x < min{1− da ,
a+w(s˜)−1
a+d−1 }, the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = 1.
(ii) 1− da < x < min{
a+w(s˜)−1
a+d−1 ,
a−d
1−d}, the stable equilibria are p
∗ = {0, 1}.
(iii) a−d1−d < x <
a+w(s˜)−1
a+d−1 , the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = 0.
(iv) a+w(s˜)−1a+d−1 < x <
a−d
1−d , the locally stable equilibria are p
∗ = {p˜, 1}.
(v) x > max{a−d1−d ,
a+w(s˜)−1
a+d−1 }, the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = p˜.
Proof. Appendix B
There are two scenarios in which cooperation survives in a globally stable
equilibrium: with high separation sustained by strict norms and corresponding
high levels of internal punishment, and in very integrated societies sustained
by intermediate norms and correspondingly lower levels of internal punishment.
Note that only the latter equilibria are polymorphic. Maybe somewhat counter-
intuitively, integrated societies sustain heterogeneity while separated societies
imply monomorphic equilibria. Also note that the share of w- types in the
polymorphic equilibrium is maximized at x = 1.
With endogenous norm strengths the relation between integration and norm-
internalization (and thus cooperation) is not monotone. The reason is that inte-
gration affects preferences via two channels. It affects behavior and thus norm-
internalization, but this has feedback effects on the strength of the social norm
itself. If separation is high these feedback effects can be so strong that agents
having internalized the norm lose their ability to react to exploitation (cooper-
ating will be a dominant strategy for them). In these cases even more separation
is needed to protect the norm. The rigid population structure characterized by
high separation leads to strict norms, which need even more rigidity to survive.
Rigidity is self-reinforcing. The following example illustrates these results.
Example I Consider the case where norm strength depends linearly on norm-
internalization (i.e. where w(s) = s). Assume that a = 3/4 and d = 1/2.
In this case a + d > 1 (for a w- type the loss of unilateral cooperation
is higher than the gain of unilateral defection). As can be seen in Figure
3 for x < 1/3, the norm is strict in equilibrium (w = 1) and p = 1 is
globally stable. For x ∈ [1/3, 1/2] both monomorphic equilibria are locally
stable with strict norms in both cases. In the equilibrium p = 0 norm
strength is linearly decreasing in x (w = 1− x). For x ∈ (1/2, 3/5] norm
strength is intermediate but only p = 0 is locally stable. The reason is that
for x < 3/5 w- types are unconditional cooperators even for intermediate
norm-strengths. Finally for x > 3/5 norm strength is intermediate (w =
2/5) and the polymorphic equilibrium p˜ = 1− 35x is globally stable.
Figure 3a - 3b about here
The case in which a+d < 1 (where the material loss of unilateral cooperation
is smaller than the gain of unilateral defection) delivers qualitatively the same
15
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result.25 Cooperation survives in a very separated society sustained by strict
norms in a monomorphic equilibrium and in very integrated societies sustained
by intermediate norms in a polymorphic equilibrium given by p̂ := 1− 1−w
−1(d)
x .
Proposition 7 If a+ d < 1, ψ → 0 and
(i) x < a−d1−d , the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = 1.
(ii) x ∈ [a−d1−d ,min{1−
d
a , 1−w
−1(d)}], the glob. stable equilibrium is p∗ = p1.
(iii) x ∈ [1− da , 1− w
−1(d)], the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ = 0.
(iv) x > max{1− w−1(d), a−d1−d}, the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = p̂.
Proof. Appendix B
Note that for both cases a + d ≶ 1 - contrary to what is obtained with
standard direct evolutionary mechanisms - the long-run equilibrium in fully in-
tegrated societies (where matching is random) is always polymorphic. Further-
more in all these polymorphic equilibria w- types are conditional cooperators,
and a positive level of overall cooperation is observed.26 This is a behavioral pat-
tern that is found also in many experimental studies on cooperation problems
in western societies.27
Summary With endogenous norm strength and for vanishingly low levels of
institutional pressures, cooperation always survives in two scenarios, with
high separation sustained by strict norms in monomorphic equilibria, and
in very integrated societies sustained by intermediate norms in polymor-
phic equilibria.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we propose and study a cultural selection mechanism for prefer-
ence traits. In particular we concentrate on social norms for cooperation and
ask under which conditions pro-social norms can survive if not all agents have
internalized these norms. The main question examined is how the institutions of
a society and in particular the degree of integration impact norm internalization
in the long run.
We find that strict norms for cooperation need either separation or strong
institutional pressures in order to survive. On the contrary intermediate norms
can survive even in completely integrated societies and with vanishingly low lev-
els of institutional pressures. Endogenizing the strength of the norm we find that
there are two scenarios under which cooperation can survive. The first scenario
is that of a rigid society, displaying a high degree of separation and very strict
25The case a+ d = 1 is described at the end of Appendix B.
26In the case of Proposition 6 σ∗ = p˜ , and in the case of Proposition 7 σ∗ can be obtained
from the equation given in Propositon 4 (substituting p̂).
27Fischbacher et al (2001) find that roughly 50% of the participants in their public goods
experiment are conditional cooperators, 30% always free-ride and only very few cooperate
unconditionally. See also Grimm and Mengel (2007a, 2007b) and the references contained
therein.
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norms sustained by strong internal punishment. Cooperation in this scenario is
achieved through rigid population structures that in turn lead to strict norms.
The second scenario is one of an integrated society with intermediate norms
sustained by lower internal punishment and displaying heterogeneity of types in
equilibrium. Here integration stabilizes a polymorphic equilibrium with norms
that are not as strict. In fact in fully integrated societies all stable equilibria are
polymorphic and there is conditional cooperation. This contrasts with results
obtained by relying on standard direct evolutionary mechanisms but is in line
with experimental results.
Our findings show that the relation between integration and cooperation
is not as simple as commonly assumed in the literature that centers around
the group-selection idea.28 Whether higher separation (locally) helps or hurts
cooperation depends on how strict norms are. In particular if norm strength is
endogenous the relation between integration and cooperation is non-monotone
and more separation will often be detrimental to cooperation. The reason is that
if cooperation is sustained through social norms there can be feedback effects
from the interaction structure on the norm itself. High separation can render
norms so strict that agents having internalized these norms lose their ability
to react to exploitation. Given the recent revival of group selection ideas, it is
important to delimit the context in which these results obtain carefully.
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A Appendix A (Exogenous Norm strength)
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. Assume a + d 6= 1. (The case a + d = 1 is treated below). There are
four zeros of (6): p∗ = 0, p∗ = 1 and
p∗1/2 =
(1− a− d) + ψ(a(1− x) − d)
2(ψx(1 − a− d))
∓
√
[(a+ d− 1)αx− αxψ(a(1− x) − d)]2
−4(α(a(1 − x)− d) + ψ)(αψx2(1− a− d)
2(αψx2(1 − a− d))
.
The derivative of the state equation evaluated at the two monomorphic equi-
libria is given by
f ′(p)|p=0 = x(ψ + α((1− x)a− d)
f ′(p)|p=1 = −x[ψ + α(1 − ψx)((a− d)− x(1 − d))].
29
f ′(p)|p1/2 is a complicated expression, but we know that if a+ d ≶ 1,
lim
ψ→0
p1/2 =
a(1− x)− d
(1− a− d)x
=: p0
whereas the other zero diverges (limψ→0 p2/1 =∞)
Furthermore we have that f(p, ψ) as given by (6) converges uniformly to
f(p, 0) = p(1− p)xα(Πw −Π0) as ψ → 0. This can be seen by noting that
|f(p, ψ)− f(p, 0)|
= p(1− p)xψ(1− px(Πw −Π0))
≤
ψ
4
, ∀p ∈ [0, 1].
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In addition f ′(p, ψ)
uniformly
→ f ′(p, 0). This allows us to write
lim
ψ→0
f ′(p, ψ)|p1/2 = f
′(p, 0)| limψ→0 p1/2=p0
= −α
[(a− d)− xa][x(1 − d)− (a− d)]
1− d− a
.
Then it is easy to see that p∗ = 0 is locally stable iff
0 < ψ < α[d− (1− x)a] := ψ2. (11)
For ψ → 0 this condition reduces to x > 1− d/a and p∗ = 1 is locally stable
iff
((a− d)− x(1− d) > 0) ∨ (ψ >
α(x(1 − d)− (a− d))
1− αx((a− d)− x(1 − d))
=: ψ1). (12)
Again for ψ → 0 this condition reduces to x < (a − d)/(1 − d) and p1/2 is
locally stable iff
−α
[(a− d)− xa][x(1 − d)− (a− d)]
1− d− a
< 0. (13)
Let us consider the four cases of Proposition 1. (i) In this parameter range
f ′(p)|p=0 > 0 and f
′(p)|p=1 < 0, so we have that p
∗ = 0 is unstable and p∗ = 1
is locally stable. Continuity of f(p) implies that the number of regular interior
equilibria has to be even. As α(Πw−Π0)(1−ptx∆)+ψ =: Φ(p, ψ) is a quadratic
polynomial in p for any given ψ there are at most two regular interior equilibria.
Two constellations of the payoff parameters have to be distinguished: if a+d < 1
we have that p2 > 1 and if a+d > 1⇒ p1 < 0. As there can neither be exactly
two nor exactly one interior solution, there has to be none. (ii) For the second
part observe that in this parameter range f ′(p)|p=0 > 0 ,∀ψ ∈ [0, 1] while
f ′(p)|p=1 < 0 iff ψ ≥ ψ1. For ψ arbitrarily small both monomorphic equilibria
are thus unstable. p1 ∈ (0, 1) and p2 diverges as a + d < 1. Also note that the
number of interior equilibria has to be odd. (iii) Observe that in this parameter
range f ′(p)|p=1 < 0 whereas f
′(p)|p=0 < 0 iff ψ ≤ ψ2. For ψ → 0, p
∗ = 1 and
p∗ = 0 are stable. The interior equilibrium p2 is unstable (as a + d > 1) and
separates the basins of attraction of the two locally stable equilibria. (iv) In
this region f ′(p)|p=1 < 0 whenever ψ ≥ ψ2, while f
′(p)|p=0 < 0 iff ψ ≤ ψ1. For
arbitrarily small ψ it is clear that only p = 0 is stable. Interior equilibria are
unstable.
Statement of result Case a+ d = 1 :
Whenever x < 1 − da (=
a−d
1−d ) the unique stable equilibrium is p
∗ = 1 and
whenever x > 1− da the unique stable equilibrium is given by
p∗ =
{
1 if ψ ≥ ψ1
0 if ψ < ψ1
.
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Proof of Corollary 1a:
Proof. ”If”: It follows from (12) that ψ > ψ1 is sufficient for local stability of
p = 1. ψ ∈ [ψ2, ψ1] implies that both monomorphic states are unstable. Exactly
one regular interior zero thus exists. We know that if a+d < 1 this polymorphic
equilibrium is locally stable. ”Only if”: Local stability of p = 1 implies either
x < a−d1−d or ψ > ψ1. But x <
a−d
1−d implies ψ1 < 0.
Proof of Corollary 1b:
Proof. ”If”: It follows from (12) that ψ > ψ2 > ψ1 is sufficient for local
stability of p = 1. ψ ∈ [ψ1, ψ2] implies that both monomorphic states are locally
stable. ”Only if”: Global stability of p = 1 is sufficient for x < 1 − da <
a−d
1−d ,
but x < 1− da implies ψ2 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. First note that (D,C, p) is a Nash-equilibrium iff piwt (C, z
∗) ≥ piwt (D, z
∗)
where z∗ = (D,C) or equivalently if and only if
[1− (1− p)x]a ≥ [1− (1− p)x](1 − w) + (1 − p)x(d− w)
⇔ p ≥
(1 − w − a)− x(1 − d− a)
x(a+ d− 1)
=: p˜ ≤ 1.
p˜ > 0 iff x > a+w−1a+d−1 ∈ [0, 1]. In case 1b the population dynamics is then
given by
·
p =
{
p(1− p)x∆ if p < p˜
p(1− p)x[α(Πw −Π0)(1 − px∆) + ψ] if p ≥ p˜
.
In the case of arbitrarily small ψ there are two zeros of this dynamics: p∗ = 0
and p∗ = 1. Note that limψ→0 p2 = p0 < p˜ and limψ→0 p1 =∞. The derivative
of the state equation is
f ′(p) =

(1− 2p)x∆ if p < p˜
(1− 2p)x[α(Πw −Π0)(1− px∆) + ψ]
+p(1− p)x(−x∆α(Πw −Π0))
if p ≥ p˜
.
Note that p = 0 is unstable whenever p˜ > 0 and x > 0 as in this case
f ′(p)|p=0 = x∆ > 0. Furthermore we know that p = 1 is locally stable iff
f ′(p)|p=1 = −x[ψ + α(1− x∆)(a − d(1− x)− x)] < 0
⇐⇒ x <
a− d
1− d
∨ [x >
a− d
1− d
∧ ψ > ψ1].
Remember that x ≤ a+w−1a+d−1 ⇔ p˜ < 0. If this is the case w-types are uncon-
ditional cooperators and the proof of case (i) and case (ii) can be read directly
from the Proof of Proposition 1.
Case (iii): x ∈ (a+w−1a+d−1 ,
a−d
1−d ]. We have that x >
a+w−1
a+d−1 ⇒ p˜ > 0 ⇒
f ′(p)|p=0 > 0 and x ≤
a−d
1−d ⇒ f
′(p)|p=1 < 0. Consequently p = 0 is unsta-
ble (
·
p > 0 ∀p < p˜ ) and p = 1 globally stable.
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Case (iv): x > max{a+w−1a+d−1 ,
a−d
1−d}. We have that x >
a+w−1
a+d−1 ⇒ p˜ > 0 ⇒
f ′(p)|p=0 > 0 and x >
a−d
1−d ⇒ f
′(p)|p=1 < 0. Consequently both p = 0 and
p = 1 are unstable. As furthermore there is no interior regular equilibrium, p˜ is
stable with basin of attraction [0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 4 and 5:
Proof. First note that (D,C, p) is a Nash-equilibrium iff piwt (C, z
∗) ≥ piwt (D, z
∗)
where z∗ = (D,C)
⇔ [1− (1− p)x]a ≥ [1 − (1− p)x](1 − w) + (1− p)x(d − w)
⇔ p ≤
(1 − w − a)− x(1− d− a)
x(a + d− 1)
=: p˜ ≤ 1.
If p ≥ p˜ w-types will randomize using action σ∗w = (σ
w∗
C , (1−σ
w∗
C )). pi
w
t (C, σ) =
piwt (D,σ) implies
[1− (1− p)x]σwCa = [1− (1− p)x][σ
w
C(1 − w) + (1− σ
w
C)(d− w)]
+(1− p)x(d− w)
⇐⇒ σw∗C =
w − d
[1− (1− p)x](1 − a− d)
.
Exspected material payoffs of a w-type are thus given by
Πw =
{
[1− (1 − pt)x]a if pt ≤ p˜
ad−w(1−w)−(1−p)(ad−(1−d)w)x
(a+d−1)(1−(1−p)x) if pt > p˜
. (14)
The exspected material payoff of a 0-type is
Π0 =
{
ptx+ (1− ptx)d if pt ≤ p˜
d+ (1−d)(w−d)px(1−a−d)(1−(1−p)x) if pt > p˜
. (15)
Inserting into the population dynamics gives
f ′(p, ψ)|p=0 = x(ψ + α((1− x)a− d)
and
f ′(p, ψ)|p=1 = −
α(w − d)x(1 − d− w − x(1 − d))
1− a− d
.
Then p = 0 is locally stable iff 0 < ψ < α(d − (1 − x)a) = ψ1. p = 1 is
locally stable iff x < 1−d−w1−d .It can be easily seen that in the limit where ψ → 0
no interior regular equilibrium exists for the region where p ≥ p˜. In the region
where p < p˜ the unique regular interior equilibrium is given by p1. Remember
that limψ→0 p1 = p0 < p˜, limψ→0 p2 = ∞ and that p0 > 0 is equivalent to
x < 1− da in this parameter region. Furthermore given that x < 1−
d
a stability
of p = p1 requires
f ′(p)|p=p1 = −α
[(a− d)− xa][x(1 − d)− (a− d)]
1− d− a
< 0
⇔ x >
a− d
1 − d
.
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By noting that 1 − da >
a−d
1−d and
1−w−d
1−d ≥
a−d
1−d∀w ∈ [d, 1 − a] the four cases
from the proposition can be easily verified.
Appendix B (Endogenous Norm-strength)
In order to state the proof for Proposition 6, first note that p = 0⇒ s = 1−x
and p = 1⇒ s = 1. Denote
(1 − w(s)− a)− x(1 − d− a)
x(a+ d− 1)
=: Γ(p)
and p˜ the solution to Γ(p) = p with corresponding norm strength w(s˜).The
following Lemma shows the existence of such a solution:
Lemma 1 There exists x̂ ∈ [0, 1] such that if x ≥ x̂ there is a unique fixed point
p˜ (solving Γ(p) = p) with corresponding norm strength w(s˜) ∈ [1− a, d].
Proof. First note that as w(s) ∈ C2, w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1 there exists s˜ such
that w(s˜) ∈ [1 − a, d]. Assume that x ≥ a+w(s˜)−1a+d−1 =: x̂ ∈ [0, 1] . Furthermore
note that w(s) ∈ [1− a, d] implies p ∈ [1− 1−w
−1(1−a)
x , 1−
1−w−1(d)
x ]. Define
Ψ(p) = Γ(p)− p.
Obviously Ψ(p) is a continous function of p. If x ≥ x̂ we have that Ψ(p) maps
the non-empty, compact and convex interval [1− 1−w
−1(1−a)
x , 1−
1−w−1(d)
x ] into
R. Furthermore Ψ( 1− 1−w
−1(1−a)
x ) =
1−w−1(1−a)
x > 0, and Ψ( 1−
1−w−1(d)
x ) =
−w−1(d)
x ≤ 0 if x ≥ x̂. Consequently ∃p
∗ ∈ [1 − 1−w
−1(1−a)
x , 1 −
1−w−1(d)
x ] such
that Ψ(p) = 0. Uniqueness can be seen by noting that
Ψ′(p) =
−w′(s)
(a+ d− 1)
− 1 < 0
i.e. that Ψ(p) is strictly decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. From Propositions 1 and 3 it follows that given a + d > 1 the interior
zero p2 will always be unstable independently of the strength of the norm.
Note also that a + d > 1 ⇔ 1 − d/a < (a − d)/(1 − d). Next examine the
stability of the three candidates p = 0, p = 1 and p = p˜. Focus first on the
case where p = 0. Then we have that if x > 1 − w−1(1 − a), (2) corresponds
to a prisoners’ dilemma payoff-matrix and consequently p = 0 is unstable. If
x ∈ [1 − w−1(d), 1 − w−1(1− a)], (2) represents a stag-hunt game. In this case
p = 0 is stable iff x ∈ [1 − da ,
a+w(s˜)−1
a+d−1 ]. Finally if x < 1− w
−1(d), cooperation
is a dominant strategy in game (2). Remember that in this case p = 0 is locally
stable iff x > 1 − da . Noting that
a+w(s˜)−1
a+d−1 > 0 iff x < 1 − w
−1(1 − a), we can
summarize that p∗ = 0 is locally stable iff
x ∈ [1−
d
a
,
a+ w(s˜)− 1
a+ d− 1
] ∧ ψ < ψ1. (16)
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On the other hand p = 1 implies w = w(1) = 1 > max{1− a, d}. Then it is
clear that p∗ = 1 is locally stable iff
x <
a− d
1− d
∨
{
x >
a− d
1 − d
∧ ψ > ψ2
}
. (17)
Finally noting that a+w(s˜)−1a+d−1 < 1⇔ x > 1−w
−1(d), we have for ψ → 0 that
p˜ is locally stable iff
x >
a+ w(s˜)− 1
a+ d− 1
. (18)
Comparing conditions (16), (17) and (18) the five cases from the proposition
follow.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Observe first that (a − d)/(1 − d) < 1 − da in this parameter region.
Consider the equilibrium p = 0. In this case whenever x > 1 − w−1(d), (2)
corresponds to a prisoners’ dilemma payoff-matrix and consequently p = 0 is
unstable. If x ∈ [1−w−1(1− a), 1−w−1(d)], (2) represe ts a chicken game. In
this case p = 0 is stable iff x > 1− da . Finally if x < 1−w
−1(1− a), cooperation
is a dominant strategy in game (2). Remember that in this case p = 0 is locally
stable iff x > 1− da .Summarizing thus p
∗ = 0 is locally stable iff
ψ < ψ1 ∧ x ∈ [1−
d
a
, 1− w−1(d)]. (19)
By contrast p = 1 is locally stable iff
x <
a− d
1− d
∨
{
x >
a− d
1− d
∧ ψ > ψ2
}
. (20)
Observe then that in case (i) p = 1 is globally stable; in case (ii), p = 1
and p = 0 are unstable and ∀p ∈ [0, 1] the norm is either strict or intermediate.
Consequently p = p1 is globally stable (Proposition 1); in case (iii) p = 0 is
globally stable (as 1 − w−1(d) > x > 1 − da >
a−d
1−d ). In case (iv) p = 0 and
p = 1 are unstable (as x > a−d1−d ). We have that ∀p with w(s) > d,
·
p <
0. Whereas ∀p such that w(s) < d,
·
p > 0.The globally stable equilibrium is
thus the polymorphic state where the norm switches from being weak to being
intermediate. This is the state where w(s) = d or equivalently where p = p̂.
Statement of result Case a+ d = 1
Whenever w < 1−a defection is a dominant strategy for both types, whereas
whenever w > 1−a defection is a dominant strategy for a 0-type and cooperation
for a w-type.30 If ψ → 0 and
(i) 0 < x < a−d1−d (= 1−
d
a ), the globally stable equilibrium is p
∗ = 1.
(ii) x ∈ [a−d1−d , 1− w
−1(d)], the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ = 0.
(iii) x > 1−w−1(d), the globally stable equilibrium is p∗ = 1− 1−w
−1(1−a)
x .
30If w = 1 − a = d the bilateral game represented by Aw is trivial as all payoffs (matrix-
entries) are equal.
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